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In 1889, at the height of their competition for African territory, the imperial powers met at 
Brussels to discuss their obligations in the colonization process. The key resolutions called on 
all colonizers to abolish traffic in slaves, weapons, and liquor. The fact and the contents of the 
agreement are revealing; rival powers were defining themselves through a formal treaty as a 
community of civilized nations holding each other to certain standards. At the same time, they 
defined Africans as people who enslaved each other, who were violent, and who could not 
contain themselves in social interaction. 
This is an article about changing moral standards in colonialism, as shaped by the interaction 
of different imperial powers and above all by interaction with colonized peoples. It concerns 
free labor ideology: the belief that a labor market unconstrained by bonds of personal servitude 
and governmental coercion provides the best means to achieve a just wage, just working con- 
ditions, and social progress. This concept was central to the European indictment of African 
society in the years of conquest: the antislavery publicists shaped an image of Africa based on 
the antitheses of slave and free labor, of tyrrany and civilized government, of closed, defensive, 
subsistence-oriented communities and open market economies, of stagnation and progress. But 
such oppositions became much more difficult to sustain in practice: making labor power, not 
the person of the laborer, into a marketable commodity meant more than abolishing a legal 
category or status, but creating new cultural and social forms, tasks that involved a level of 
From the early 19th century, the European debate over the slave trade and slavery 
pioneered a new international discourse in which the concept of free labor defined 
a universalistic standard for the conduct of Europeans in colonies and non-Euro- 
pean societies. Implementing free labor, however, entailed a confrontation with 
the particular work culture and values of local communities, from ex-slaves to in- 
dependent peasants. This article examines the connection between imperial pow- 
ers‘ critiques of each others’ conduct-and the role of international fora in defining 
imperial morality-and their encounter with African social structures. Colonial 
states were inextricably drawn into confronting Africans as social beings: first in 
trying to induce them to become disciplined wage workers, then to contain the 
conflicts unleashed in places of work and urban residence. By the 1940s, this 
meant exporting to Africa European approaches to containing class conflict. Co- 
lonial cities became less the realm of the colonial expert and more that of the “in- 
dustrial relations” specialist, who argued against migratory labor and in favor of 
taking Africans out of their cultural milieu and reproducing their families under the 
eyes of European welfare experts, even if this implied paying family wages or fam- 
ily allowances that exceeded the free market price of labor. Only with decoloni- 
zation did France and Britain take themselves out of the social and political inti- 
macy of the workers’ milieu and participate in a new-or rather old-international 
discourse on the moral and social virtue of the free market. [labor, migration, re- 
production, slavery, welfare, decolon ization] 
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intimate involvement in African communities that British and French bureaucracies could not 
attain. The more ambitious schemes for converting slave to wage labor failed, giving rise to a 
more formalistic opposition of colonial powers to African slavery and government forced labor 
and a new attempt to make the nontransformation of African culture and society seem desira- 
ble. 
But the problem was not just that getting Africans into wage labor was a many-faceted social 
process, but that once inside places of work, Africans were still social beings, and the relation- 
ships and attitudes they formed among themselves helped to determine how efficiently they 
worked and how much danger they posed. This article focuses on the plunge colonial powers 
took from the universal dichotomy of free and coerced labor into the murky waters of social 
life, and the way in which they got themselves dry again. A sharp break occurred in both British 
and French thinking about the relationship of wage labor to African society in the 1940s. Even 
tiny working classes could strike, and they were threatening the narrow channels of colonial 
commerce, just as the war and the weaknesses in imperial economies that it revealed under- 
scored British and French need for their empires. At the same time, the idea of “self-determi- 
nation” was becoming salient in international politics. Trying to articulate a forward-looking 
colonial social policy-while trying to contain workers’ reactions to the strains of their daily 
lives-colonial officials began to think that shaping an African working class might be desira- 
ble. Such a class could be separated from the dangerous masses who moved back and forth 
between vulnerable cities and the backward countryside. 
Such thinking was both universalist and ethnocentric: the European precedent of taming a 
once truculent working class became the model for bringing orderly progress to Africa. This led 
the imperial powers to set forth a universal social standard-based on the perceived experience 
of European workers-for how African workers should live, overriding the economic standard 
of the market wage. Thinking about the African worker as an acultural industrial man repre- 
sented a sharp break in European conceptions of African society, yet outside the sphere of cap- 
italist production and reproduction, African culture was portrayed as more traditional and 
backward than ever. 
We then come full circle. Decolonization brought back the purism of free labor ideology. 
international agencies and academics told African governments to pay workers no more than 
the market wage and to reduce social services, and they left fledgling governments to face the 
social and political consequences if workers could not maintain a minimum standard of living 
or reproduce themselves. This article i s  schematic and selective in coverage and bibliography; 
its aim is to suggest connections over long periods, across wide distances, and between dis- 
courses and practices; it necessarily glosses over differences, peculiarities, and nuances, all of 
which deserve further attention within the framework developed here. 
emancipation and imperialism in theory and practice: a cycle repeated 
The discussion begins after a very important act had already been played. The British gov- 
ernment, in particular, had already faced the ambiguities of implementing free labor ideology 
after the emancipation act of 1833, even as it succeeded in obtaining a European consensus 
on the immorality of the slave trade.’ Officials had expressed both hope and skepticism that 
universalistic economic considerations-the individual’s pursuit of gain-would induce black 
ex-slaves in the West lndies to work for wages (Davis 1974, 1984). In fact, they soon learned 
that ex-slaves had their own conceptions of economy. 
In Jamaica, most notably, freed slaves sought to combine subsistence cultivation, marketing 
of the produce of their hillside gardens, and periodic forays into earning wages on sugar plan- 
tations. As the planters tried to tighten discipline on the plantations, ex-slaves distanced them- 
selves. Sugar exports declined as other productive activities increased (Holt, forthcoming). The 
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colonial office saw the slaves’ tendency to remove themselves from the plantation zone as a 
reversion to ”savage sloth,” and argued that land had to be tightly controlled to insure that ex- 
slaves sought wage labor: “The dread of starving is  thus substituted for the dread of being 
flogged. . . . The ‘Emancipist‘ undergoes a transition from the brutal to the rational predica- 
ment.” The colonial secretary, three years after emancipation, took this argument one step fur- 
ther: kept from straying in search of land, ex-slaves would be “more open to civilizing influ- 
ences, more directly under the control of Government, more full of the activity which is inspired 
by common wants, and the strength which is derived from the division of labour; and altogether 
. . . in a sound state, morally, politically and economically, than if left to pursue its natural 
course.”2 
This last phrase is revealing: already the ”natural course” was proving inadequate; free labor 
was not driving all else before it. Ex-slaves on British islands, with their own ideas about re- 
making their lives, were not making British planters’ sugar production competitive with that of 
Cuba’s slaves. A silence opened up in colonial discussions of the West Indies: as Trouillot (this 
volume) notes, the growing semiautonomous peasantry could not be acknowledged as such in 
a dialectic of property and labor, of work and idleness. But in Jamaica, the clash over land led 
to violence in 1865, and fears of disorderly blacks took their place alongside concern with 
idleness. Idleness and disorder came increasingly to be explained in racial terms. The mere 
freeing of labor appeared more and more inadequate and any ambitions to spread progress to 
backward peoples seemed to require direct control. 
This experience conditioned attitudes toward Africa. So, too, did the fact that the abolition 
of the slave trade-along with the increase in agricultural exports from Africa to Europe during 
the course of the 19th century-led some African societies to import more slaves and use them 
more productively. Whatever the nature of these slave regimes, their growth spread violence 
in the vast catchment regions on which the reproduction of the slave population depended. 
Commerce, it seemed, was not leading to the generalization of human progress, but to its con- 
finement to certain regions and certain classes. 
That was the point taken up by David Livingstone, Cardinal Lavigerie, and the other anti- 
slavery publicists of the 1860s and thereafter; they portrayed Africa as a slave-ridden continent, 
and their critiques extended beyond enslavement as such to the violence and tyranny of African 
rulers and the unchanging backwardness of cultivators. Livingstone portrayed the slave trade 
as “an insurmountable barrier to all moral and commercial progress,” destroying the order 
necessary for normal trade, ruining incentives to engage in agriculture or wage labor, inducing 
people to accept demeaning forms of protection, and keeping people in a state of defensive 
isolation rather than one of progressive interconnection and receptivity to new ideas.’ Even 
outside of slave trading zones, explorers and traders attacked the violence and unpredictability 
of African rulers and the reluctance of Africans-particularly male Africans-to work (Cairns 
1965:80-81, 194-1 98). The African king stood beside the slave trader, accused of imposing 
the brutal predicament and opposing the rise of the rational one.“ 
This new trend in antislavery writing provided a vivid way of bringing Africa into a wider 
discourse on society and progress: a clean break was needed to create in Africa social structures 
capable of orderly reproduction and economic expansion. The influence of such thinking helps 
to explain the concern of Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium-expressed at their meeting 
in Brussels in 1889-to spell out the standards for conquering powers and their stress on free 
labor, order, and self-discipline. Their agreement pointed to the desire of imperial powers to 
delineate a new colonialism, explicitly and collectively rejecting the freebooting, the looting, 
the enslaving of past colonialisms in favor of building institutions for the systematic and con- 
trolled exploitation of colonial resources. Lord Salisbury called the Brussels Conference the first 
in history that met ”for the purpose of promoting a matter of pure humanity and goodwill” 
(Miers 1975:xi). 
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Free labor ideology was thus embedded within the system of imperial self-justification from 
the start, and the Brussels treaty made it likely that different states would keep an eye on each 
other. Within Great Britain, not only the old Anti-Slavery Society (later joined to the Aborigines 
Protection Society) and the missionaries, but a group of West African merchants (notably John 
Holt and E. D. Morel) who had a vested interest in a market model of imperialism insured that 
government actions would be subject to critiques within the e~tablishment.~ 
The process of conquest itself necessarily involved tests of power with slave trading African 
polities, and invaders began to evoke their heroic struggles against slave traders and the peace- 
ful, fecund world they were creating for the Africans.6 Conquest reinforced antislavery ideology 
in another way: by attacking the power of slavers, providing alternative sources of protection 
to dependence on slaveowners, and introducing new chances to obtain subsistence or income, 
conquest made it easier for slaves to flee or disobey (Cooper 1980; Miers and Roberts 1988). 
Slave resistance made it difficult for colonial regimes to take African systems of production as 
they were: slavery became less productive and more disorderly, and colonial regimes were in 
the politically untenable position of having to take specific actions, such as returning runaways, 
to support slavery. 
Thus, even colonial officials who realized the difficulties of following up on antislavery ide- 
ology most often found they had at least to acquiesce to the ending of slave labor. But the British 
tried some more radical experiments in the enforced transformation of slave to wage labor. 
Frederick Lugard argued that even if slavery were “well suited to the African,” it was incom- 
patible with progress: 
In the first place, slavery cannot be maintained without a supply of slaves, acquired under all the horrors 
of slave-raids, and transported with great loss of life from their original habitation; this results, not only 
in much human suffering, but also in a decrease of the population, and consequently in a decrease of 
the productive capacity of the country; secondly, no people can ever progress if personal initiative and 
personal responsibility is denied to them. . . . That existing slaves may be happy in their lot is no argu- 
ment to the mind of any one who aims at the progress of the race in a remoter future I1 906:1351. 
Lugard, in northern Nigeria, wanted to turn slaveowners into landowning, wage-paying agri- 
cultural capitalists, and slaves not into peasants but into workers. 
So, too, did officials who had taken over Africa’s most effectively organized system of slave 
plantations, on the East Coast of Africa. Even missionaries agreed-using the language of class 
of contemporary London-that slaves, if not supervised, “would tend to produce a demoral- 
ized and dangerous class of people, such as would be sure in the future to embarrass the good 
government and to mar the prosperity of the country.”’ One central question was open to de- 
bate: was ending the legal status of slavery itself sufficient to create a wage labor economy, or 
should the state intervene to ease the transition and maintain discipline? The latter course pre- 
vailed, and abolition in Zanzibar in 1897 was accompanied by ratification of slaveowners’ land 
titles, Compensation intended to help them pay wages, and pressure to get ex-slaves to accept 
year-long labor contracts on their former owners’ plantations. A campaign against vagrancy, 
theft of agricultural produce, drinking, and personal violence was put forth as a means of in- 
stilling discipline into unruly ex-slaves and creating a society divided into those who owned 
property and those who worked. The purists of the labor market-led by Quaker missionar- 
ies-opposed the government’s support of contracts: discipline during the contract period re- 
lied on the brutal rather than the rational imperative. 
In practice, the main problem was that ex-slaveowners did not necessarily play the proper 
role of capitalist landlord or ex-slaves that of worker. Northern Nigerian elites preferred ex- 
torting tribute from small farmers to supervising the production process itself until an anxious 
government gave up its crusade for agrarian capitalism. Ex-slaves in East Africa established 
themselves as squatters and tried to combine casual labor, subsistence cultivation, and cash 
crop production to avoid becoming dependent on any one of them (Lennihan 1982; Cooper 
1980). In French West Africa, a governor-general could boast in 1905 of creating out of ex- 
slaves “a new class of free and salaried workers,” but in fact many ex-slaves had gone to their 
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ancestral lands or taken up cultivation on their own, or else entered into complex, long-term 
social and religious relationships with old or new elites, hardly constituting a class for whose 
labor anyone could bid (Klein 1986; Miers and Roberts 1988). 
As in the West lndies 70 years previously, colonial officials in parts of Africa were trying to 
maintain a class system and export production, using state power to preserve property rights 
and to inculcate work discipline, while abolitionist critics protested infringements of the purism 
of the labor market. Colonial states were at times willing to promote proletarian discipline for 
the benefit of nonwhite ruling classes; their ability to redefine class relations in a European 
image was nevertheless very much in question. 
The logic of the argument for turning slaves into wage laborers applied equally well to peas- 
ants: instead of facing slaves’ brutal predicament, peasants-growing their own food-faced 
no predicament at all. Some missionaries tried to imagine an African world of sturdy cultivators 
accepting Christian self-discipline, hard work, monogamy, and the outward, commodified 
signs of inner salvation-from Western clothing to square houses to plows. But it was far from 
clear that converts could not incorporate Christian values and Western commodities into their 
own, quite different social visions (Beidelman 1982; Comaroff, this volume). Where the de- 
mands capitalist development made on Africans expanded the most rapidly-in South Africa- 
the gradual extension of market relations and individualistic values proved completely inade- 
quate: labor discipline was achieved through a systematic assault on the access of African cul- 
tivators to the land. 
A now large literature details the pitfalls on the road to capitalist development in Africa (re- 
viewed in Cooper 1981). Like the linkage of economic and social progress with slave eman- 
cipation in the 183Os, the linkage between progress and imperialism at the end of the 19th 
century foundered in the encounter with people with their own conceptions of economic life. 
Colonial states and humanitarian lobbies were brought directly into the messiness of social 
structure. At the turn of the century, governments tried to create African proletarians, success- 
fully in South Africa, not so in northern Nigeria or East Africa; they tried to ignore social ques- 
tions where produce flowed smoothly and order was maintained-as in the Gold Coast-and 
they learned to accept what previously had seemed undesirable, such as the Muslim marabouts 
of Senegal who mobilized labor in their own ways for peanut cultivation. States used their fiscal 
and regulatory powers to shape the parameters of commerce, but had to accept the limits of 
their ability to restructure production. After a couple of decades of experience colonial ideo- 
logies would lose the radical, interventionist implications of the late 19th-century critique of 
African society and find a new mission in preserving elements of African culture. 
the critique of forced labor and its limitations 
These same years were crucial to determining how serious European nations were about 
each other’s practices. The key test came in King Leopold’s Congo. In 1908, over two decades 
after European powers had agreed to let Leopold rule personally over the Congo and after years 
of controversy over the horrors of forced rubber collection in his domain, they pressured him 
to convert the Congo into a proper Belgian colony. Although rubber collection actually ended 
because the rubber was exhausted, the cession of the Congo showed what kind of colonialism 
was unacceptable in polite company. 
There is more to the scandal than an international campaign of the morally righteous against 
unscrupulous greed. The man who helped break open the scandal, Roger Casement, was heir 
to the spirit of antislavery ideology; his allies in the expos6 of Leopold included leading British 
West African merchants who practiced what they preached. Their attack not only developed 
the imagery of horror-the raids on villages, the murder and torture of people who failed to 
meet their rubber quotas-similar to antislavery literature, but it did so in stark contrast to the 
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benign appearance of market transactions. Yet such a contrast presumed what Leopold’s 
henchmen could not: that Africans had already accepted the rational world of markets (Taussig 
1987). 
In extracting labor by terror, the companies not only created Leopold’s economy, but Con- 
rad’s Africa. The very act of terrorism created an aura around its victims: African irrationality 
that impeded rational men from doing business, the savagery of Africans that justified brutality. 
Taussig (1 987) argues that terror had its aesthetic qualities, linked to the exoticism of the prim- 
itives with whom the terrorist became intimately engaged, and to the conceit that the savage 
was in his own way powerful and dangerous, with magic powers that the white man simulta- 
neously scorned, feared, and wanted. 
Casement wanted to naturalize the free market just as the terrorists wanted to naturalize their 
version of African culture. His powerful writing indeed helped undo the horror, but to undo a 
precisely bounded horror. The deeper questions of the conflict of cultures, of the images of 
savagery, and of the peculiar nature of capitalist economic rationality and the difficulties of 
transporting it to Africa lay unexamined. At the very end of the colonial era, savagery and coun- 
tersavagery would reappear in European discourse on Africa, in a final assault on primitiveness 
in the name of modernity. 
The reformist critique of imperialism gone wrong-extended later to Portuguese and Liberian 
labor roundups for plantations on offshore islands (Duffy 1967; Sundiata 1980)-emphasized 
by contrast the morality and normalcy of colonial rule. All the while, South Africa was reducing 
African land rights, uprooting squatters, and enforcing discipline on African workers through 
pass laws, control of residence, and other means. South African labor policy has long had its 
principled critics, but on the international scene they had no sure handle to pry open the le- 
galistic and systematic approach to creating a proletariat. Africans might be suffering the costs 
of progress, but not the reactionary oppression of slavery. 
France and Britain, facing in most of Africa a situation where Africans could distance them- 
selves from the “rational predicament” of wage labor, themselves often skirted the boundaries 
of free labor ideology, and faced regular criticism from the purists of the labor market. The 
critics frequently used the word ”slavery” to dramatize policies that strayed beyond the bounds 
(for example, Harris 191 9). All regimes evoked public purpose, above all the need to develop 
transportation networks to open Africa, to justify the provisional use of forced labor. French 
officials employed a military metaphor: they recruited young men to the army, then hived off 
the “deuxihe portion du contingent” for involuntary, low-paid, public works labor. In fact, 
official recruitment of unwilling laborers for private concerns continued in French Africa until 
1946 (Fall 1984; Echenberg and Filipovich 1987). 
The British government insisted that it abhorred forced labor, but practiced it in mines in the 
Gold Coast and Rhodesia. Words like “recruitment” were carefully employed, but Africans in 
Rhodesia used the word chibaro-meaning slave in local languages-for recruited laborers. 
During World War II, the British “conscripted” labor for coffee farms as well as tin mines, and 
aflerwards they cited soil erosion to justify forcing people to labor on conservation projects (van 
Onselen 1976; Killingray 1986; Throup 1987). 
But in African villages, relations between chiefs and people were nested in a complex of 
affinity and power far more subtle than the distinction between coerced and free labor. As a 
British official in Kenya put it, obtaining labor from a chief for the benefit of white settlers ”de- 
pended on how far he could be induced to exceed his instructions.“ A rare honest inspection 
report into the French system commented in 1931, “No written instruction was ever addressed 
to administrators on their conduct in this matter. And yet everyone knew the boss’s wishes, 
everyone trembled for his promotion and did not dare formulate explicitly any criticism what- 
soever 
A new silence opened up in colonial discourse: the realities of labor recruitment could not 
be discussed forthrightly. Even when a sympathetic minister in Paris ordered recruitment for 
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private individuals to stop in 1936, he could never be sure that the persuasion-the “apostolat 
du travail”-to which his local officials said they were limiting themselves was in practice very 
different from obligatory labor. In British Africa, the often eloquent critique of official coercion 
for private profit did not penetrate the patterns of landownership and power that actually 
shaped the conditions of labor.9 
Already by the 1920s the free labor question in various colonies was becoming less salient 
(Berman and Lonsdale 1980). The new equilibrium was as much a consequence of decreasing 
European aspirations as of the growing necessities that pushed Africans into labor and produce 
markets. The areas from which most export crops came were in fact quite limited, and the social 
relations of production in them were varied. The islands of European production-the Central 
African mines, the Kenya highland settler farms, or the Ivory Coast plantations-drew their 
labor supply from large catchment areas. It came forth-and not simply because Europeans 
wanted it this way-for relatively short periods of time. A small demand for manpower required 
large numbers of potential laborers, and worked most predictably when large regions were so 
impoverished that wage labor became part of the life cycle. By the late 1930s and 1940s, the 
adverse demographic and economic effects of this pattern were beginning to enter official and 
unofficial discussions (Ebou6 1945; Davis 1933; Wilson 1941 1. 
In the Depression years, African agricultural and labor systems-at a large cost to Africans- 
proved quite good at contracting: problems of social security were sloughed off onto the coun- 
tryside, but cash-poor Africans still had to supply at least some crops or labor. Still, officials 
began to realize that such a system would respond poorly to renewed demands for production: 
higher crop prices would make African cultivators more independent. A report from French 
West Africa-at a time when two percent of the population was working for wages-warned 
that recruitment had already reached its limits.’” 
That i s  to anticipate the rethinking of the labor question that began in the late 1930s. But 
before that, another sort of imperial myth had its reign. Europeans’ self-portrayal as bringing a 
slave-ridden, barbarous continent under civilized and progressive rule gave way, by the 1920s, 
to the contention that rural Africa was tradition-bound, stable, living in the organic harmony 
of ancient social structures (Ranger 1983:247-251). Lugard, who had once vainly tried to make 
northern Nigerian slaveowners into agricultural capitalists, made the myth a policy: indirect 
rule (Lugard 1922). French officials eventually applied their own pastoral imagery to Africa and 
supported development through peasant production within traditional communities. Urban 
workers were termed “detribalized,” or a “floating population”; they were more of an aber- 
ration or a pathology than a normal part of colonial society.” Colonial officials now needed to 
reconcile themselves to the limits of their own power to exploit African resources and labor 
systematically. Some of them publicly lamented the mediocrity of imperial economic accom- 
plishments, but in both Britain and France calls for a new round of interventionist development 
in the 1920s and 1930s came to little (Constantine 1984:30-61; Rich 1986:27-49; Marseille 
1984). 
in this context, free labor ideology became formalistic, although it remained explicitly inter- 
national. The League of Nations issued its ”Slavery Convention” in 1926, reminding colonial 
powers to stop the slave trade and slavery, while asking the International Labor Organization 
to investigate “the best means of preventing forced or compulsory labour from developing into 
conditions analogous to slavery.” This was done in the ILO Convention of 1930, which strongly 
condemned forced labor for private purposes and created elaborate regulations for compulsory 
public works labor, arguing that it should be phased out (International Labor Organization 
1929:l-2; 1939:179-193). In practice, free labor ideology could be reaffirmed at the expense 
of minor states, Liberia for instance. The French-believing their colonies had less potential 
manpower than those of the British-were in the awkward position of being unable to ratify 
the ILO convention of 1930 until the Popular Front finally did so in 1937. This decision, in turn, 
reflected senior officials’ concern about the hypocrisy of their own discourse: 
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We lie in France, in Europe, in the entire world, in Geneva and at the International Labour Organization 
when, regulations and circulars in hand, we speak of the organization of public works labor in the col- 
onies. We dishonor our colonial administration and we demoralize our civil servants by asking them to 
apply, on paper only, regulations inapplicable in practice.12 
We see here both the influence and the limits of international codification of free labor ide- 
ology. It treated forced labor as a clearly identifiable and immoral administrative practice, un- 
ambiguously separated from free labor, but it did not address the complex context in which 
Africans worked: the visions of economic life through which they tried to allocate their time 
and effort and the web of rural power through which administrations and chiefs extracted labor 
power. But by the mid-1 9305, workers themselves were forcing colonial officials to examine 
the implication of wage labor, and after the war Britain and France would once again be trying 
to rethink their labor policies as part of a coherent vision of imperial pr0gre~s.l~ 
toward an industrial soclology for Africa 
Before World War II, international discussions of labor in Africa focused on the issue of force; 
Africa was remote from the active rethinking of labor control, welfare, and industrial relations 
going on in Europe.14 When international gatherings resumed after the war, a different set of 
issues was on the table. The 1944 meeting of the ILO called attention to the responsibility of 
independent states for “the well-being and development of dependent peoples,” and discussed 
the question of setting “international minimum standards and . . . the improvement of these 
standards.” Mention was made of “public health, housing, nutrition, education, the welfare of 
children, the status of women, conditions of employment, the remuneration of wage earners 
and independent producers, migratory labour, social security, standards of public services and 
general production.” At its next meeting in 1947, a new ILO convention on social policy looked 
toward the application of ILO standards for European workers to the colonies (ILO 1944,1947). 
What happened to change the agenda? At the end of the war, Britain and France were both 
desperate to mobilize inadequately exploited African resources to revitalize troubled econ- 
omies. At the same time, the words ”self-determination” had come into international voca- 
bularies, and colonial powers now justified their continued rule as necessary to guiding back- 
ward areas toward social and economic development; they were suddenly eager to make Af- 
rican living standards a matter for public discussion (Marseille 1984; Louis 1978; Cooper 
1987). Both elements of development strategies implied the need for more labor, more efficient 
labor, and better conditions for labor. 
But the new language appeared in a context which suggests another cause: in official reports 
on the waves of strikes between 1935 and the late 1940s. These strikes were not routine in- 
dustrial relations disputes, but mass urban events, following the fluid lines of a labor system in 
which most Africans moved into and out of particular jobs and into and out of the category of 
“worker.” The copper mine strike in Northern Rhodesia in 1935 spread from mine to mine to 
other inhabitants of the mine towns; officials thought it was spreading (in the absence of a 
union) via religious organizations, dance societies, personal networks, and mass gatherings. 
The investigating commission, labeling the problem a “disturbance,” thought it could be con- 
tained by more systematic repatriation of workers who had completed contracts and by rein- 
forcing traditional authority (Northern Rhodesia 1935; Parpart 1983). 
The West Indian strikes and riots of 1935-38 took officials aback and made it difficult for 
them to think of African tradition as the remedy for colonial problems. And in 1940 a second 
strike in the Copperbelt, resulting in more deaths, revealed that the problem in Africa remained 
to be solved. In Parliament, a future colonial secretary had observed shortly earlier that thinking 
of such events as “disorders” made them harder to solve than if they were considered ”simple 
industrial disputes.” The search had begun for a vocabulary that would put African workers 
into a sociology of industrial capitalism rather than an anthropology of colonial ~0c iety . l~  
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A series of strikes in East Africa’s leading port, Mombasa, helped focus such thinking. The 
commission studying the general strike of 1939 saw that casual dock laborers, working by the 
day, were part of an amorphous urban mass, much larger than the number of people working 
at any one time, straining housing and other resources, and creating a wide field for disorder. 
It hoped that a compact labor force, steadily employed, could be given better and more con- 
trolled housing and isolated from its fellow urbanites. During the war, attempts were made to 
settle disputes by “scientific” adjustments of wages, based on fluctuations in the cost of food, 
clothing, and other seemingly objective components of a minimum standard of living. In 1945, 
yet another commission reentered the realm of the social. A new strike movement had revealed 
the presence of an “urbanized working class,” many of whose members had spent years on 
the job and lived with their families, but who had no more lifetime opportunities than casual 
workers. All sellers of labor power shared a common “class consciousness, complicated by 
race consciousness.“ Continued turbulence could be averted by separating out a class of work- 
ersfrom the urban mass and allowing them to become “civilized” by bringing up their children 
in the city in decent conditions. The committee turned around the central rationale of prewar 
migratory labor policy: ”the evils which are commonly attributed to ‘detribalisation’ can only 
be cured by more complete detribalisation” (Kenya 1945; Cooper 1987). 
Strike movements and urban riots in Nigeria (1942, 1945, 1949), the Gold Coast (1947, 
1948), Tanganyika (1  947), and Zanzibar (1  948) confirmed such lessons. The argument about 
order applied to productivity as well: if workers and their families remained at the workplace, 
Africans would become acculturated to urban and industrial environments, and productivity 
would rise. The key was to separate workers from the backward countryside (see for example 
Northcott 1949, and for a fuller analysis, Cooper 1987). 
When French officials arrived at a similar perspective, it represented a rapid reversal. After 
the collapse of Vichy, officials revived the Popular Front’s ”politique du paysannat,” arguing 
that Africans should advance within their own village society, avoiding the formation of a pro- 
letariat.16 Even more revealing, forced labor was still an issue. French officials in 1944 re- 
hearsed all the old arguments about the virtues of free labor-although they had been espe- 
cially worried about the demographic consequences of pulling Africans from their villages- 
but had so little faith in the free labor market that they proposed phasing out official recruitment 
over five years and retaining a form of public service labor.” In the event, forced labor was 
eliminated after two years, victim of the need to create stable political institutions and the utter 
incompatibility of allowing electoral politics and labor roundups to coexist. It was Felix Hou- 
phouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, the kind of African ’‘6volu6” with whom the French wanted 
to cooperate, whose political mobilization of the Ivory Coast countryside made recruitment 
impossible and who, in the Assembly, proposed the law that abolished it.18 
One reason local officials were content with this turn of events was that Houphouet and his 
fellow lvorien planters were in the midst of organizing another form of work: they attracted 
northern migrants to their forest cocoa farms, promising a share of the harvest as well as wages 
and establishing a relationship with workers that was more long-term, more like tenancy, more 
nuanced than classic wage labor. Not only was the problem of forced labor formally resolved 
by the 1946 law, but the more general question of agrarian labor in the Ivory Coast disappeared 
into an African world that colonial officials did not have to probe.” 
By this time, French officials had been thrust into a modern resolution to another labor crisis. 
In early 1946, a two-month long strike movement, including a general strike lasting 1 1  days, 
shut down Dakar, the leading city of French West Africa. At one time or another, the movement 
involved civil servants and ordinary laborers, clerks and market sellers. Officials feared it would 
spread to peasants. 
The Governor-General reported that he could not stop the strike or maintain the policy of 
restraining wages and prices. His confession of powerlessness revealed that colonial officials 
could not act as colonials in this delicate situation. Instead, they invoked metropolitan concepts 
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of settling industrial disputes. A labor inspector arrived who believed “There is  a technique to 
organizing work, as with everything, and it cannot be improvised.” He set out to negotiate with 
individual unions, seeking accords with specific branches of the work force and the establish- 
ment of hierarchical pay scales within each branch. Officials conceded substantial wage in- 
creases for most workers, as well as family allowances and other emoluments to all regular 
government workers-implicitly admitting that Africans had the same needs for social security 
as did Europeans.2o 
In ensuing years, the French labor inspectors kept arguing that “a complete hierarchy” of 
wages and benefits would both avoid “a climate of social trouble and a strike that would rapidly 
become general” and “separate out an African elite.” Seeking a work force better adapted to 
the “rational modernization of the economic structure of the country,” it was necessary “to 
select this manpower and to improve, inspired by methods tried out elsewhere, its professional 
training. Thus it can be simultaneously better paid and worth more.” Wages, in any case, had 
to be sufficient to encourage workers to acquire skill and above all “to make the family situation 
less unstable.”21 
The contents of this argument were not new; applying it to Africa was. An African worker 
was a worker, and the place of a worker in a rational economic structure fitted a pattern that 
had been worked out in Europe. Even the six-tier wage hierarchy that became the norm in 
Senegal after 1946 came straight from French precedents, and the ensuing debate over colonial 
labor legislation began with the text of the metropolitan Code du Travail. For their part, West 
African trade union leaders were remarkably quick to take up the idea of a universal industrial 
man-with common behavior patterns and, surely, common needs. “Your goal is to elevate us 
to your level; without the means, we will never succeed,” said one union leader at a bargaining 
session, leaving his opposition speechless. The slogan “2 travail Cgal, salaire Cgal” became a 
rallying cry; French officials could not formally deny the validity of the claim, and even insisted 
in private that they accepted it.22 Officials in fact wanted to believe that the metropolitan model 
of industrial relations would contain African labor disputes, that Africans would quickly learn 
the skills and habits of industrial men, and that their families would acquire the consumer hab- 
its-and hence the predictability-of European workers. 
Unable to defend inequality among workers, officials tried to define who was a worker and 
exactly what rights he or she had: the debate over the Code du Travail for Overseas France 
lasted six years. The comprehensive nature of the proposed legislation politicized the labor 
movement, and its success, above all in the West Africa-wide general strike of November 1952 
that jarred Paris into final action, gave it a new self-confidence. 
The final language excluded “customary” laborers from its coverage. The act included peo- 
ple compensated solely by wages and eliminated thousands of people compensated by access 
to land or shares in crops. For those classified as workers, provisions were modeled on the 
French Code: a 40-hour week, paid vacations, accident insurance, trade union rights. So much 
had the discourse changed, that the patronat-the old defenders of colonial privilege-could 
find no better argument against the code than equality, professing alarm that the Code discrim- 
inated against peasants in favor of workers (Moreux 1953). The right had taken the language of 
equality from the left; they would bequeath it to the purists of the market in the post-colonial 
era. 
This brings us back to the international scene. France and Britain had been trying to maintain 
a common ideological front in defense of enlightened imperialism (Michel 1983). A new or- 
ganization, the Inter-African Labour Conference, began regular meetings in 1948, with the par- 
ticipation of France, Britain, Belgium, South Africa, Portugal, and the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland; its resolutions show the translation of the results of concrete struggles into ac- 
cepted principle. The first meeting came out in favor of trade union rights; minimum wage 
legislation; vocational training; developing programs of “social security” to insure against all 
risks “and to assist the wage earner in meeting his immediate family obligations”; old age pen- 
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sions “where tribal organisation has ceased to be effective“; and efforts toward “increasing the 
wage-earning capacity and general standard of living of the people of Africa and the creation 
of a well-balanced state of society.” In 1950 came more specific standards, and above all a 
section on “stabilisation and migration of workers.” It began with a l is t  of the ”social evils” 
stemmingfrom migration, and its proposals to regulate whatever migration still took place were 
specific enough to evoke a Portuguese dissent. But the goal was for workers, except for tem- 
porary labor, to be “established permanently in residence with their families at or near their 
places of employment.” Efficiency implied stabilization and that meant good housing and diet, 
”encouragment of normal family life,” and some form of “social security.”23 
We are far from the free labor market, much closer to a notion of workers having universal 
needs that can be objectively understood, measured, and met. The most revealing issue of all 
was family allocations. In 1953, delegates agreed that wages, social services, and benefits paid 
to workers “should take account of and include provision for his family responsibilities.“ Dis- 
cussion focused on cash or in-kind allowances paid by the employer or the public and given 
on a per child basis for prenatal and maternity services and for the cost of raising children. The 
benefits should go “to workers who, by reason of their being detribalised, no longer benefit 
from the traditional help enjoyed by workers who have remained in their tribal env i r~nment . ”~~ 
France, along with Belgium, was responsible for the 1953 text, which was based on domestic 
policy. Striking African civil servants had forced the issue onto the agenda in 1946, and lower 
ranking civil servants had won a portion of the allocations given to the top ranks. This inequality 
proved impossible to defend publicly, and a 1950 law established the principle of equal pay 
and allocations for equal work within the civil service.25 The Code du Travail accepted the idea 
of family allowances for workers-as it defined them-in the private sector, but left open the 
question of implementation. 
This immediately put family allocations onto the top of every list of demands from the labor 
movement, which planned demonstration and strikes, and led the Governor-General to fear 
“generalized agitation” and “social malaise” that would “undermine our authority” unless 
speedy satisfaction were given.2b The experts worked out a relatively modest and affordable 
plan, vehemently opposed by the patronat. It did not apply to the population in general-as 
did family allocations in France-but only to wage earners as defined by the Code du Travail. 
In making the case for family allocations, French officials expressed the fear that working men 
“who were the most able-bodied, and as a result the most useful element from a demographic 
point of view” faced such difficult conditions of family life that they tended toward “abstention 
in the domain of marriage and of procreation”-a concern with the quality of reproduction 
that bears comparison with issues raised by Stoler (this volume). At the same time, they ex- 
pressed the hope that providing aid to workers’ families would not only promote stability in 
employment, but would lead to social and cultural progress: “the disaggregation of the tradi- 
tional family corresponds to an emancipation, a liberation of its members, of which we should 
not complain.” Social progress had its price: 
the African wage-earner, head of a family, above all the detribalized urban worker, runs into particular 
difficulties from the fact of having to support a family, notably when, having attained a certain level of 
social evolution and of stabilization as a worker, he tends to base his conditions of life on those of the 
European ~ o r k e r . ~ ’  
It was so obvious to officials that the wage worker they were discussing was male that they 
did not need to say so. The assumption reflects a mixture of French expectations of sex roles 
and African behavior (however caused) in the labor market: wage labor, as opposed to other 
forms of work, was in fact a largely male domain. But the perceived relationship of gender and 
work had changed during the colonial era. The precolonial male was often portrayed as averse 
to steady and productive labor-he was sapped by slavery and the violence of savage life, and 
he left agricultural production to women. But in the 1950s vision of economic development, 
African men had become at least potentially productive, and women remained primitive cul- 
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tivators and the bearers of backward culture. The plan for family allocations assumed a working 
father and a child-raising mother, who would be required to submit to medical consultations 
during and after pregnancy and who would have to send the children to school in order for her 
family to receive the benefits that derived from the father’s employment. Workers would be 
induced to bring their women and children out of village life and place biological and social 
reproduction under the aegis of doctors, nurses, schoolteachers, and bureaucrats.** Surveil- 
lance would be as much a part of the new Overseas France as of the old, but now it would be 
the responsibility of the professionally qualified guardians of health and education, not of co- 
lonial generalists who knew their natives. 
As plans were drafted and redrafted between 1950 and 1956, officials became increasingly 
aware that their own arguments had been seized by the labor movement, for whom family 
allocations had become a leading issue, and the focus of a renewed attempt at organizing West 
Africa-wide strikes. The labor inspectors’ dream of a self-reproducing labor force became their 
nightmare: social engineering was not to be the work of social engineers, but part of a political 
process that built its own momentum, feeding on African victories as well as French sociolog- 
ical 
British colonial officials avoided part of the problem, but only part. They feared exactly what 
happened in the French case: that state-mandated family allowances would make workers 
think ”that their interests could be better advanced by political agitation than by action in the 
industrial field.” Yet these same officials were convinced that wages still had to support a fam- 
ily. The conservative colonial secretary in 1954 explicitly put the necessity for a family wage 
above the principal of the free labor market: ”even where the ‘bachelor wage‘ sti l l  represents 
the supply price of labor, it may be below the level of wage necessary to secure efficient pro- 
du~tion.”’~ 
British officials thus ended up with a sociology of work similar to that of their French coun- 
terparts. Although they escaped wide challenges from unions, they had more trouble with spe- 
cific ones, being unable to invoke a general labor code whenever employers resisted paying 
the costs of a stable work force. In key areas like the Copperbelt and Mombasa, weak industrial 
relations machinery could not contain disputes, and officials turned to African politicians and 
trade unionists, who acquired prestige among Africans and cautious respect from officials for 
settling conflicts that whites could not solve (Cooper 1987; Parpart 1983). 
Both French and British colonial governments calculated the costs of social reproduction 
independently from the market wage, and sought a stark separation of industrial culture from 
African culture. Their sociological dualism echoed the dualism in vogue in economic theories 
of the time (Lewis 1954). A French study in 1953 argued that remaking African attitudes to time 
and work discipline was difficult but essential. 
It i s  exceptional that a black accepted the need to carry out his effort beyond the simple task in order to 
increase his gains. For that to happen, it is necessary that he has been profoundly Europeanized, that he 
has adopted our motivations and accepted our own necessities. In a word, that he has retained nothing 
African except the color.” 
British experts were making the same point: “We cannot hope to produce an effective African 
labour force until we have first removed the African from the enervating and retarding influence 
of his economic and cultural background” (Kenya 1954: 11 ). 
Such thinking became widely accepted in French and British Africa by the mid-1950s. The 
French implemented their program of family allocations throughout their African domain in 
1956: workers with several months of employment who registered marriages and births and 
whose wives and children submitted themselves to periodic medical examinations received a 
series of modest payments from before birth to completion of a child’s s ~ h o o l i n g . ~ ~  British wage 
policy remained inconsistent, but the “bachelor wage” was complemented in Kenya and other 
colonies by a second minimum wage intended-however unrealistically-to cover the needs 
of a family, applied to workers with a record of stability in urban employment. In actuality 
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urban wages ceased to cluster at the minimum as they had before the mid-1 9405, while settler 
influence kept rural wages miserable (Cooper 1987:131, 158-1 62). 
The powerful vision of a stable labor force developed in the decade after the war referred 
very little to research on African cities and workers; it had much more to do with the industrial 
sociology of advanced capitalist econ~mies .~~  Urban anthropology developed after the shift in 
official thinking. Although founded in 1937 in the heart of the Copperbelt, the Rhodes-Living- 
stone Institute and its innovative researchers were kept off the copper mines for a decade, and 
the pioneering urban research of J. C. Mitchell and A. L. Epstein began at the end of the 1940s. 
Around the same time, the founder of francophone urban anthropology, Georges Balandier, 
discovered “an Africa different from that which had been taught to me by the maitres des so- 
ci&% primitives,” first among the intellectuals of Dakar and later among the poor of Brazza- 
ville.’” Africanist urban research received an international intellectual imprimatur with the pub- 
lication by UNESCO ( 1  956) of the collective volume Social lmplications of Industrialization 
and Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara, some eight years after officials had begun their 
own international meeting to share their wisdom on the labor question. As urban anthropolo- 
gists carved out a distinct domain for careful investigation, they were exploring what labor of- 
ficials already claimed to know: that the African worker was a worker. French and British labor 
officials had reached by their own route the position staked out by Gluckman (1961 :69), “An 
African townsman is  a townsman, an African miner i s  a miner.”35 
But for officials in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the idea that European knowledge was the 
key to understanding the African worker was something they desperately wanted to be true. 
The vision of African industrial man was a fantasy, an inversion of what officials feared was 
actually happening around them, of urban masses, of rootless workers, of migrants unable to 
cope with modern life. And as officials came to believe that an African worker could be mod- 
ern, they developed an increasingly negative view of the African who was not. Indirect rule 
had implied a condescending vision of African life, but it conceded some complexity and in- 
tegrity to African culture. Left in his own cultural milieu, the postwar African was, as in Conrad’s 
Congo, the inversion of modern man. 
In the last decade of colonial rule, the imagery of savagery and countersavagery, of terror 
and counterterror, reappeared in Africa, chillingly set against the bland universalism of indus- 
trial sociology. The Mau Mau revolt became a symbol to many Europeans of the atavism that 
still lurked within African culture. Trying to promote a more “stable” African working class, to 
improve agricultural techniques and to foster a class of progressive African farmers with solid 
titles to land and solid commitment to market production, and to use settler farms as an example 
of modern techniques and a source of export income, Kenya officials became captives of their 
own developmental ideology. They had no clear way of analyzing the grievances of people 
burdened by their soil conservation programs or of the squatters who were expelled from settler 
farms that were rationalizing production, only to find in their home districts a class of accu- 
mulating Africans eager to shed their social obligations. The ensuing revolt, in official accounts, 
became a rebellion against progress (Kanogo 1987; Throup 1987; Cooper 1988). 
It was a self-serving, but not altogether false, charge: the squatters‘ had encountered not only 
white and black accumulators, but a universalistic ideology that defended accumulation in the 
name of free market justice, the legitimacy of private property, and economic progress, as well 
as Christianity and Western civilization. Against this powerful edifice, the forest fighters devel- 
oped their own radical particularism, invoking a romanticized Kikuyu past. Guerrilla attacks 
were directed against those Kenyans most caught up in cultural as well as material terms in the 
modernism of postwar colonialism. The colonial state used the alleged savagery of the forest 
fighters to inflict its countersavagery: roundups, collective punishments of villages, concentra- 
tion camps, and the forcing of prisoners through psychological rituals of admitting and repu- 
diating their savagery (Cooper 1988). 
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Mau Mau, which settlers and die-hard colonialists first saw as proof that firm European rule 
was necessary for the indefinite future, instead came to demonstrate that the costs of maintain- 
ing settler regimes amidst the contradictory imperatives of rationalizing production and stabi- 
lizing society were too high. The Gold Coast riots of 1948 had earlier signaled to British officials 
their incapacity to maintain order in cities burdened by officials’ modernizing fantasies. The 
people whom they saw at the time as the demagogues likely to lead the mob into politicized 
violence would shortly emerge (sometimes from prison) to become the respectable African po- 
litical class on which Britain could pin its hopes for avoiding mass unrest. Mau Mau revealed 
the worst fears and a possible solution, the dangers within African culture and the hope for 
molding a respectable political class, a respectable working class, and a respectable landown- 
ing class, sharing certain universal values. The fantasy of the modern and the fantasy of the 
savage shaped each other, and the frightening qualities of the latter led officials to want to 
believe ever more fervently that the former could be found. 
decolonkation and the return of the purism of the market 
The debates over family allocations and family wages marked the apogee of colonial thinking 
about labor. They were part of a reassertion of control in a period of direct challenge from urban 
masses and organized workers and of growing anticolonial movements in many parts of the 
world. The reassertion of power within the workplace entailed playing down the “otherness” 
of the colonized and the “colonialness” of the state. Although the fear of African atavism be- 
trayed a lack of confidence in the modern African, the search for a self-reproducing working 
class still put more faith in slow but ineluctable social processes than in the continual exercise 
of wise authority by European officials. 
None of this explains decolonization, but the thinking about an important social problem- 
beginning at a time when political independence was far from an acquired proposition-hints 
at an intellectual process that made it possible to imagine an Africa that Europeans could un- 
derstand, with which they could interact, but which they did not rule.36 A colonial problem did 
not have a colonial solution; the most immediate and plausible solution required thinking of 
African workers as workers more than as Africans. Nor was it clear that centrally managed 
development programs were going to be the new face of imperial authority that they had ap- 
peared to be for a brief moment after the war. By the mid-1 950s, the aggressive hopefulness of 
the early planners was spent, sapped by grandiose plans that had gone wrong, costs that had 
escalated, commercial progress that could be wiped out by the smallest wobble in world mar- 
kets, and social conflict that seemed to be exacerbated as often as eased by development efforts. 
The fervid hope for economic development had to be separated from problems of implemen- 
tation and its consequences. 
The new discourse on social questions was part of the means by which Western leaders and 
social scientists in the 1950s convinced themselves that development and modernization were 
self-propelling processes. But when Europeans still governed, such a discourse was unstable 
and dangerous: colonial governments were confronted with all the difficult and unpredictable 
consequences of economic and social change as well as with the logical consequences of the 
new forms of imperial self-justification. The focus on social and economic development legi- 
timized the European standard of living as a reference point for the aspirations of Africans. The 
argument could not be contained: the language in which officials discussed labor-and their 
yearnings for a stable and predictable African working class-implied that there was no logical 
stopping point short of providing wages and family allocations equal to those of European 
workers. It was extremely difficult for a colonial power to insist that it was right for a worker in 
Marseille to live in comparative security and for a worker in Dakar to live a life of misery even 
if the determinants of a market wage-the comparative affluence of French agriculture and the 
poverty of Senegalese-meant that each received a “just” wage.37 
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By the mid-1950s, one can begin to read signs of relief that African politicians were begin- 
ning to be confronted with the concrete problems of managing social change. In 1957, a num- 
ber of politically active trade unionists in French West Africa prepared to contest elections. As 
responsible, if junior, ministers of a government, these officials would now be on the receiving 
end of labor demands, and French analysts expected that such African officials would respond 
as the French wished they could, giving “meager satisfaction.” They hoped that dissatisfied 
workers would be held in check by “their respectful fear of local African authorities, who will 
not lack the means to make their point of view prevail.” The British government, too, began to 
hope African politicians could resolve conflicts they themselves could 
Such thoughts were part of the crisis of self-confidence of late colonialism, and a step away 
from the intimate involvement with African society into which colonial governments had been 
thrust. The fantasizing of the African as industrial man could sometimes-as in modernization 
theory-reach as far as a totalizing vision of African society becoming modern. Eventually, 
decolonization removed the colonial powers from the social consequences of economic pro- 
cesses, from precisely what they had found impossible to avoid in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, both in international fora and in the streets of African cities. 
Decolonization redefined the format and soon the contents of international discussion of 
living standards. Bodies like the United Nations and the World Bank made themselves the cus- 
todians of moral responsibility as well as of a large proportion of development finance. True to 
the kind of standards that it had been advocating since 1944, the ILO promoted in the 1970s a 
“basic needs approach” to development, arguing for the universality of certain human wants 
and the importance of a worldwide effort to meet them. 
South Africa, meanwhile, has come to occupy in international moral discussions the place 
once taken by African slavery and King Leopold’s Congo. Labor reforms analogous to those 
implemented in French and British colonies were discussed in the 1940s and rejected in favor 
of continued controlled migration and a denial that universal social norms applied to whites 
and blacks. But where decolonization has taken place, European wages and standards for labor 
conditions have gradually ceased to be the powerful reference point for Africa that they became 
in the 1940s and 1950s. 
By the 1980s, powerful voices were insisting that the free labor market was the only true 
guide to determining wages within each country, just as the world market was the best means 
of allocating resources among nations. Such discussions are international and they are moral- 
istic: poor countries are told that they have seriously erred in paying their urban workers higher 
wages (or consumption subsidies) than their national labor markets justify. The International 
Monetary Fund has used its moral force and financial power to persuade 30 of the 45 sub- 
Saharan African countries to cut government social services and food subsidies for urban work- 
ers (Washington Post, 16 October, 1987). Academics give powerful support to such arguments, 
and use populist language to do so: the “urban bias” of African governments has hurt the rural 
poor. The arbiter of justice-the just wage, the just price, the just national income that a country 
with given resources can attain-is the market (Bates 1981 ; Lipton 1977). Such arguments tend 
to leave the rural producer as an asocial, acultural responder to market incentives, and they do 
not help to visualize what urban life would be like: how will the ragtag army of the miserably 
employed produce on the job and behave in the city? 
This is just the question which French and British officials faced in the 1940s. They found 
their answer in an ethnocentric sociological fantasy and they could not reconcile it with the 
complexities of exercising power over people with their own visions and plans. The bounded 
universalism of industrial sociology was then challenged, if not displaced, by the even more 
universal claims of international economics. 
The irony of the return of free market morality is  that it i s  also coming home. Severed from 
the standards of labor relations and welfare of advanced industrial countries, removed from the 
protected markets of colonial empires, some ex-colonial countries, in Asia above all, have be- 
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come successful enough at low-wage production to compete with the exports of old industrial 
countries. And so the reverse of what happened in the 1940s and 1950s begins to happen now: 
the standards of wages and benefits of the ex-colonies become a reference against which the 
ex-metropolitan powers need to measure themselves. 
conclusion: Ideology, social policy, and the tensions of rule 
This article has followed the tensions of imperial ideologies and colonial practices through 
four cycles: First, the idea, articulated in England between the late 19th century and the 18305, 
that free labor would bring economic progress and social justice to slave colonies broke down 
by the 1860s in the face of the complexities of forging a postemancipation society and the 
alternative social visions that ex-slaves developed. The peculiarities of the Negro race were 
increasingly invoked to explain why West Indian laborers deviated from the universal expec- 
tations of classical economics. 
Second, the European critique of African slaving and tyranny from the 1860s to the 1890s, 
which justified an interventionist imperial policy in the name of economic progress and social 
justice, broke down by the 1910s and early 1920s in the face of the difficulties of remaking 
rural African society. The peculiarities of African culture became an explanation for lack of 
progress, and social conservatism was proclaimed to be a positive good. 
Third, the conservative colonial social agenda of the 1920s broke down in the late 1930s 
and 1940s in the face of the inescapable and disturbing presence of wage laborers in cities and 
mines, of the escalating demands being placed on African colonies, and of the hope that Afri- 
cans could be industrial men. 
Finally, the attempt to apply European concepts of industrial relations to African workers 
proved to be an inherently unstable ideological construct, legitimizing new demands on the 
colonial state while delegitimizing the control mechanisms of the colonial state itself. Deco- 
Ionization, however, permitted the distancing of former rulers from the tensions and contradic- 
tions of economic change and a return to the abstract principles of free market justice. 
Over these long years, several themes stand out. Beginning with Britain’s leadership of an 
international movement against the slave trade-imperial ideologies were explicitly interna- 
tional and explicitly moralistic. Free labor ideology provided a singular, acultural concept of a 
just organization of labor, transcending divisions of state and religion. The moralistic and in- 
ternational dimensions of imperial ideology were reaffirmed at international conclaves from 
the Brussels Conference to ILO meetings and by ritualized criticism of select violators, a pattern 
continued in the post-colonial age. 
From the 1830s to the 19605, colonial powers’ pursuit of a universalistic justification for their 
intervention into the organization of labor ran up against the complexities of social reproduc- 
tion. The critique of forced labor in the Congo, as of the slave trade, emphasized that obtaining 
labor in such ways depended on reproducing labor forces outside the workplace, on predation 
of distant societies. This made impossible the generalization of commerce and a market in labor 
power. Making Europe’s relationship to Africa capable of continuity and expansion implied the 
imposition-by force-of a new kind of government and a new intervention into social life. In 
practice, this proved beyond the means of Africa’s colonizers. The failure of colonial schemes 
to make landowners into agricultural capitalists and slaves into workers left in its wake a variety 
of forms of production in African agriculture, some more easily harnessed to imperial needs 
than others, and a series of arrangements for extracting labor power from African societies with- 
out controlling the reproduction of that labor power. 
The critiques of migrant labor that emerged in the late 1930s and became dominant in co- 
lonial policy in the late 1940s paralleled earlier critiques of slave labor. The question was what 
kind of worker African societies reproduced, and answering it brought colonial states to try to 
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extend their control from the abode of production to the abode of reproduction. Whereas the 
migrant labor system and indirect rule assumed that African society possessed a unified tradi- 
tionalism, while the African worker lived a dual existence between the workplace and the vil- 
lage, the postwar vision implied that African society was dualistic but the worker lived a unified 
existence. An African working class had to reproduce itself even if the costs of its reproduction 
exceeded the market wage. 
The postwar view of African labor and the reproduction of an African working class rejected, 
on the face of it, racist notions of African difference, but embraced, in universalistic language, 
an ethnocentric vision of what society should be. That reveals a great deal about the assump- 
tions that became deeply embedded in the postwar discourse of international agencies and 
academics, about the ways of thinking woven into conceptions of modernization and devel- 
opment that are still relevant today. 
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